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Abstract 
 
 Existential, or non-somatic suffering, is often associated with the management of refractory pain 
at the end-stage of life. Because of misleading sympathologies, this condition is often either mis-
diagnosed or even ignored. When diagnosed as a part of a futile medical condition, this Paper argues that 
deep, palliative, or terminal sedation be offered to the distressed, dying patient as an efficacious and 
ethical response to preserving a semblance of human dignity in the dying process. Not only is this option 
of care humane and compassionate, it is consistent with the ideal of best patient care. The notion of care 
should not only address and include somatic issues of intractable pain management, but—as well—non-
somatic or existential suffering occurring in the absence of physical symptoms. Interestingly, sound 
holistic medicine traces its very province to the foundational value, or chrism of cura personalis which in 
turn directs respect be given to all individuals and to their souls. The importance of preserving human 
dignity should, thus, be recognized correctly as a human right. In sum, the doctrine of medical futility is a 
proper template for evaluating degrees of end-of-life care. Acceptance of this principle allows—in turn—





INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 Long before Dame Cicely Saunders inspired and led the modern hospice movement in 
1967,1 which was founded on “total pain management” of physical, psychological, and spiritual 
suffering,2 the Society of Jesus, founded by St. Ignatius of Loyola in 1541, embraced the 
principle of cura personalis as a foundational value or chrism.3 Within this faith-based value 
system, is a significant acknowledgment that “attention and respect must be given to the care of 
an individual person and that person’s soul.”4 In antiquity, Scribonius, a Roman physician, circa 
47 A.D., is attributed as the progenitor of the notion that the profession of medicine should 
espouse “a commitment to compassion or clemency in the relief of suffering.”5 
 Today, the World Health Organization chooses to define the contemporary goal and use 
of palliative care as that which “improves the quality of life for patients and families who face 
life-threatening illness, by providing pain and symptom relief, spiritual and psychosocial support 
from diagnosis to the end of life, and bereavement.”6 Palliating the whole person—then—
requires medicine to attend more fully to existential suffering. For this type of palliation to be 
efficacious, health care decision makers must regularly reassess patient treatment goals in order 
to not only learn how their patients define and experience pain, but the patients’ thresholds for 
tolerating various sources of distress.7 These thresholds are seen as being informed by a patient’s 
personality, which has, in turn, been shaped by life experiences and attitudes toward death 
management and quality of life in end-stage illness.8 
 Existential, or non-somatic suffering, is often associated with the end-stage of life and is 
considered generally to be refractory. 9 Because of misleading symptomologies, this condition is 
often either mis-diagnosed or even ignored. When diagnosed, as part of a futile medical 
condition, this Paper argues that deep, palliative (or terminal) sedation be offered to the 
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distressed (e.g., dying) patient as an efficacious and ethical response to preserving a semblance 
of human dignity in the dying process10—a state of dignity which surely must be recognized as a 
human right.11 As used in this context of death management, dignity or well-being is not seen as 
the dignity that philosophers debate routinely.12 Rather, it is to be taken as the term is used in 
everyday conversation and shaped ideally from the lived experience of a patient throughout his 
life. Commonly, dignity—for the average person—then, would mean an avoidance of 




MANAGING END-STAGE ILLNESS 
 “Managing” death at the end-stage of life when a futile medical condition exists, presents 
linguistic, moral, and philosophical ambiguities regarding the voluntary cessation of nutrition, 
hydration, palliative or terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.14 
Although these actions are distinct, there is a central and unifying commonality among them—
specifically, their common purpose of hastening a humane death and thereby showing 
compassion to those suffering refractory pain and existential suffering.15 
 The purpose of this Paper is to argue, and to advance the notion, that existential suffering 
is as valid a consideration as physical pain is at the end-stage of life. Because of this relationship, 
greater attention must be given by medicine to palliating the “whole person” and to accepting the 
validity of palliative sedation. As efficacious and compassionate treatment when appropriate,16 
laws should—similarly—accommodate the necessity for this procedure as its use becomes 
warranted under a theory of adjusted care.17 The law should, further, validate palliative sedation 
as humane end-of-life medical treatment and should not complicate, and thereby hinder, what are 
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sound medical responses—consistent with patient values—to alleviating conditions deemed 
medically futile.18 Legislation allowing for death with dignity as enacted in the state of Oregon,19 
Washington,20 and Vermont21 is—outside of state judicial action validating assistance in dying 
when a futile medical condition exists22—the most sensible approach toward achieving Social 
Justice.23 
 
Best Patient Care 
 The President’s Council on Bioethics in the United States concluded in 2005 that the 
basic standard for clinical decision-making should be one which promotes the best patient care.24 
This standard obviously must be adjusted continually as a patient’s case history progresses,25 and 
to promote patient care anchored in mercy, compassion, beneficence, and loving charity—care 
which recognizes that relief of pain is the most universal moral obligation that a physician must 
uphold and that there is, indeed, a right not to suffer.26 
 Psychological distress, or existential pain, however, is usually difficult to assess because 
evaluation requires special training and continual contact with the patients’ and their families.27 
There is a general societal aversion to the obstacles faced in proving a patient’s emotional 
distress at end-of-life care.28 Distinguishing between depression and psychological morbidity is 
difficult because the symptomology of disrupted sleeping patterns, loss of energy, and lack of 
appetite are not exclusive response mechanisms to psychological distress, but appear in cancer 
and other terminal illnesses as well.29 Because of these difficulties and uncertainties, the 
palliative management of existential pain has been largely neglected.30 
 While no general “solutions” exist for meeting the existential needs of terminally ill 
patients, attempts to meet these needs require careful listening skills and defined lines of 
communication between health care providers, patients, affected families, and proxy or surrogate 
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decision makers. Valid existential concerns are often obscured during palliative care treatment.31 
Even though a patient may have no absolute control over the wide and varied spectra of 
suffering, the patient still has freedom to choose what attitude is taken toward that suffering.32 
By extending end-of-life care to include psychiatric, psychological, existential and spiritual 
issues—consistent with the WHO’s definition of palliative care and its goal of addressing total 
patient needs33—a more complete, compassionate, and realistic approach to managing terminal 




 While pain is properly seen as biological and as measurable, it is—inherently—
subjective, individual and variable.35 Consequently, there is no clear understanding whether 
mental suffering and mental pain are, indeed, “equivalent or identical concepts and 
experiences.”36 Interestingly, some research has even suggested that the same brain regions 
involved in assessing physician pain are also found similarly in a number of forms of actual 
emotional distress.37 The central issue confronting law is how to deal with the “externally 
verifiable reality” of pain.38 What level of exculpation should be granted by the state to those 
attending to the anguish and suffering of those at the end-stage of life.39 Can pain and suffering 
in death be likened to the state’s responsibility to safeguard its citizens from suffering cruel and 
unusual punishment?40 
 Although existential pain has been defined as suffering “with no clear connection to 
physical pain,” it has been recognized—nonetheless—as suffering,41 which in fact, can be 
expressed as physical pain. Today, existential pain is seen, commonly, as an important clinical 




 The desire to hasten death arises because of a number of conditions: inadequate pain 
management, psychological conditions ranging from depression and hopelessness, to fears of 
loss of autonomy and physical functioning,43 to futile and unbearable suffering, and avoidance of 
humiliation.44 All of these conditions conduce to one overriding fear: loss of human dignity,45 
which brings with it a fear of being forced to become but a “passive bystander” to all of the 
normal functions of life.46 
 In approximately twenty-five percent of all terminally ill patients, depression and other 
mood disorders occur.47 Yet, interestingly, few receive pharmacological aid through anti-
depressant prescriptions.48 As this Paper shows, the main obstacle to a more liberal response to 
these patients’ needs is the lack of clarity in determining when a distressed, terminal patient is 
suffering from clinical depression or, instead, exhibiting a “normal grief response” to the dying 
process.49 The components of both of these syndromes are often vague, imprecise, and difficult 
to evaluate.50 Commonly, when patients are obsessed with feelings of worthlessness, they lose 
their ability and desire to interact socially, and—indeed—lose their sense of hope, they are 
properly assessed as suffering from clinical depression51 and should be given whatever dosage of 
analgesics is deemed necessary to alleviate that condition—because, pharmacotherapy is 
ultimately the principal tool for symptom control.52 
 Another drawback to accurate and prompt evaluations of psychological distress or 
existential suffering is often the inability of a physician or palliative care management team to 
understand patient views about suffering. As a spiritual phenomenon, suffering is often accepted 
in Christian communities as a meaningful and authentic community response to Jesus Christ’s 
own suffering.53 In some faith communities, cultural efforts are expanded in order to view 
suffering—physically and mentally—as a positive, reinforcing value. Merely accepting suffering 
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as authentic, however, does not mean that it is also meaningful.54 It remains for the physician to 
ascertain and then listen carefully to the spiritual parameters within each patient’s character55 in 
an attempt to treat those seriously ill as “whole persons.”56 In this way, the therapy is truly 
patient-centered.57 
 Refractory existential suffering—or those symptoms which defy adequate control despite 
all efforts to provide relief—is difficult to distinguish during the end stages of life from physical 
distress.58 Those additional refractory symptoms most commonly reported as requiring palliative 
sedation are: various degrees of agitation, restlessness or distress, confusion, respiratory distress, 
pain, and myoclonus (e.g., severe twitching, jerking or uncontrollable shakes).59 
 Existential care is more often than not left to the nursing staff.60 Even in the daily 
hospital bed environment, however, the nursing staff must possess a special level of sensitivity to 
understand patients’ indirect questions regarding the depth and severity of their distress over 
their terminal illness. Once understood, it typically falls upon the nurses to devise a procedure 
for providing empathetic support.61 Palliative sedation therapy is thus defined as “the use of 
sedative medications to relieve intolerable and refractory distress by the reduction in patient 
consciousness.”62 When patient suffering—physical or existential—becomes refractory to 
standard palliative therapies, the human, compassionate and merciful response is to offer 
palliative or terminal sedation.63 This approach to medical treatment may be seen as consistent 
with sound principles of adjusted care.64 
 
Cancer Pain Management 
 The management of pain in cancer patients is very often a significant challenge—this, 
because of the sub-optimal use of opioids. Studies conducted from 2008 through 2011, have 
shown conclusively that upwards of 43% of patients having cancer pain, received inadequate 
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care.65 Poor pain assessment, patient reluctance to report pain and to access opioids, physician 
reluctance to prescribe opioids and a perception of excessive-regulation of controlled substances, 
combine to serve as high barriers for easy access by oncologists seeking to effectively manage 
pain.66 
 Not only does poorly managed pain care compromise emotional and cognitive functions, 
but it curtails the activities of daily living as well as family and professional functioning.67 
Feelings of depression can also result from inadequate pain control to a point where at least one-
third of cancer patients with refractory pain feel that they want to die.68 Although the past twenty 
years have shown a remarkable frankness and openness in the oncology community about pain 
management, surveys from 1990 and 2009 have shown real gaps in knowledge and comfort 
levels among oncologists in their use of opioids to manage pain.69 A 2009 survey found 60% of 
oncologists gave incorrect responses to questions concerning clinical scenarios for management 
of break-through pain.70 
 Normal responses for patients with cancer—even among mentally healthy patients are—
hopelessness, anxiety, and fear. Termed the six D’s, the universal fear of cancer patients have 
been classified as: death, dependency, disfigurement, disability interfering with normal life 
functions, disruption of relationships, and discomfort or pain resulting from the disease itself.71 
 The extent to which a patient copes with these fears is a function of a number of factors 
including: the nature and progression of the disease itself; the individual patient’s level of 
psychological adjustment prior to the onset of the disease; the extent to which the disease 
threatens to impair the normal activities of the patient; the culture, ethical perspective and 
religion of the patient; the patient’s support network; the patient’s potential for rehabilitation; 
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 Depending upon the physiological nature of a patient’s illness and the medical treatments 
provided to cure the illness, cognitive impairment may well result. With cancer patients, 
oftentimes, “fatigue, recovery from surgery and radiation,” together with toxicity from drugs—
including antibiotics and pain medicines—may alter thinking abilities, going so far as to 
“dampening the sharpness, rapidity, and productivity of the thought processes of a patient.”74 
 For the terminally ill patient hospitalized for extended periods of time, additional 
physical as well as psychological responses to “coercive” hospital environments may—
additionally—hamper cognitive capacity to make informed, rational health choices and 
decisions.75 
 Unfamiliar health care environments—together with increased sensory inputs found 
commonly at all hospitals, result in sleep deprivation—which, in turn, not only exacerbate the 
physical and emotional trauma of terminal illness, but often lead to lassitude, lethargy, 
hallucinations, irritability, poor judgment, paranoid ideation, and hostility.76 
 With a diagnosis of medical futility from a terminal illness, comes—oftentimes—a 
profound psychological patient response, which in turn causes a variety of psychopathologies.77 
Indeed, psychological symptoms may well be exacerbated by the physiological symptoms of 
disease. Compounding this situation may be the reluctance of patients to question the very 
authority of their treating physicians which has the effect of compromising a terminally ill 
patient from engaging in autonomous, rational decision-making.78 
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 There is no consensus among psychologists regarding both the emotion and 
psychological process which occur, normally, when a terminal diagnosis is given. While Freud 
hypothesized that he general human fear of death was rooted actually in a fear of the unknown,79 
others have opined that “death anxiety does not pertain to physical death, but to the primordial 
feelings of helplessness and abandonment; thus, “the fear of the unknown or death is the fear of 
the unknown of annihilation of self, of being, of identity.”80 
 What is agreed upon, however, is that diagnosis of terminal illness, makes death 
imminent and quite often forces a patient’s realization of the inevitable and the need to address 
what, in the past, had been suppressed anxieties and fears.81 This “crisis of diagnosis” often 
triggers latent psychological issues of “dependency, passivity, and narcissism.”82 
 “Therapeutic misconceptions” are common when patients participate as subjects in Phase 
1 cancer research. One study found patient motivation to participate was because, almost 
exclusively, a hope of being cured from their illness. While expressing subjectively an 
understanding of the potential risks and benefits of the research, in fact, “they were unaware that 
the purpose of the research was to study does schedules and toxicity levels of drugs, not to cure 
them.”83 
 
European Approaches to Psychogenic Pain 
 Belgium, the Netherlands, and more recently—Switzerland, have allowed compassionate 
medical assistance in those cases where non terminal patients have endured a constant (or 
permanent) level of mental suffering which qualifies as a chronic mental disease (e.g., 
manic/depression or bipolar disorder) after years of “debilitating anxiety” or even possibly the 
“agonies of arthritis.”84 
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 In 1995, the Royal Dutch Medical Association determined that no valid distinction is 
drawn between physical and mental suffering.85 Yet, the Association cautioned that in making 
medical evaluations of non-somatic illnesses, great care and caution should be exercised in 




  The whole person care paradigm is, perhaps, the greatest challenge to health care 
management in the twenty-first century; and, at the same time, holds the greatest promise for 
realization.87 Death anxiety and existential concerns challenge not only patients, but—as well—
health professionals,88 and patients’ families.89 Indeed, non-somatic suffering is just as 
significant as somatic pain at all levels of society.90 Physicians and other healthcare providers 
“need to recognize how their own non-conscious death fears, combined with the abundant 
reminders of death that are typical of medical practice . . . influence how they diagnose and treat 
patients.”91 
 The psycho-social and the spiritual aspects of healthcare become more prominent with 
every biotechnological advance92—this, essentially because of their interconnectedness93 and 
goal-sharing of alleviating pain and suffering at all levels94 and the further growing realization 
that scientific research is revealing some “specific biological pathways, notably in the brain, 
mediating social and psychological processes.”95 Practical effectiveness of good clinical 
medicine today requires “establishing a genuinely human relationship between patient and 
doctor.”96 Achieving this can only be accomplished by “considering all facets of the person, 
including their beliefs (faiths) and spiritual understanding.”97 
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 Rather than being completely socialized into a Western medical culture which 
predisposes them to “do more” (e.g., investigations, interventions and uses of new medical 
technologies),98 and thus emphasizing “curing and fixing” rather than “healing/bearing 
witness/being with,” contemporary healthcare professionals need to be more intellectually honest 
and forthcoming in acknowledging when “death is imminent, inevitable, and perhaps timely.”99 
Patient adjusted care demands—first and foremost—a standard of total honesty between patient 
and physician100—for, without it, there can be no conscious opportunity for informed consent to 
be operative.101 When both the healer and the patient are capable of confronting, specifically, 
their existential fears regarding a terminal medical condition and the mortality that attaches to 
it,102 whole person care and the very integrity of “cura personalis” are validated; an appropriate 
measures may be undertaken in order to alleviate the conditions. Proportional humane medical 
responses to patient suffering—of whatever character—at the end-stage of life, should be given 
medically and allowed legally.103 
 
Praxis 
 Chronic disease and illness is multi-dimensional.104 Late middle to old age brings 
multiple, life-limiting co-morbidities that will lead, ultimately, to a downward spiral to death 
itself.105 Rather than emphasizing survival at all costs, quality and functioning should—ideally—
be the goals of medical care during this final phase of life.106 Realizing the meaning of the word, 
“health,” to make whole again, cannot be achieved at the end-stage of life does not mean nothing 
can be done to restore harmony or physiological and psychological function.107 Rather, it should 
be realized that, “to care, comfort, be present, help with coping, and to alleviate pain and 
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suffering are healing act as well as cure. In this sense, healing can occur when the patient is 
dying even when cure is impossible.ˮ108 
 All too often, deficiencies in clinical practice, which mar the treatment and care of 
advanced chronic disease patients, can be traced to a core deficiency in clinical praxis.109 Praxis, 
then, should mean more than the application of theory or of philosophy. Rather, praxis means 
action informed and shaped continuously by critical reflection on the end of action, on the means 
to the end, and on salient dimensions of the context within which action unfolds.110 In cases of 
terminal illness, “existential preparedness” or the ability to shepherd a patient (or the patient’s 
family) along a course accepting the eventuality of the dying process is a noble principle of 
clinical practice.111 
 Taxonomical “purities” often compound, as seen, confusion over the issue of assistance 
in dying from a terminal illness or—alternatively—committing assisted suicide.112 This 
“ongoing confusion,” in turn, contributes directly to “a cluttered moral and legal matrix.”113 
Rather than continue the quest to establish a constitutional right to assisted suicide, perhaps the 
time-honored Common Law right to refuse treatment should be seen as the cornerstone for 
building a more compassionate and enlightened ethics of understanding when managing end-of-
life issues. This right of refusal is not a right to hasten death, but merely a right to resist 
unwanted physical invasions.114 
 Whether operable normative standard for policy-making in managing death is termed 
agape, charity, compassion, love or mercy, the common unifying denominator in palliative care 






 A national dialogue must continue over how best to “manage death” at its end-stage.116 
An integral part of this discussion must evaluate humane, compassionate, approaches, together 
with efficacious medical treatments which seek to balance vitalism, or sanctity of life, with 
quality of life as consistent with established or sound medical practices.117 
 As well, wise consideration should be expanded in this dialogue which allows for 
acceptance of the notion that old age is—in actuality—a terminal illness. The key, then, is to be 
informed and educated to this eventuality and thus be prepared for what is to come. 
 A compassionate and a logical option for those in advanced age who do not wish to 
continue their lives in a terminal or futile condition should be early terminal sedation.118
 Inspired by the concept of Death Cafes, or places where individuals could meet, casually, 
and discuss all issues of death management (e.g., cemeteries, hospital care, funerals, hospices) 
first seen in France and Switzerland, in 2010, a Web programmer in England, Jon Underwood, 
introduced this notion to Great Britain.119 Presently, there are 750 death cafes in 17 countries, 
with more than 500 in the U.S. since they were introduced there in 2012.120 
 These are positive frameworks for promoting end-of-life planning and surely will go far 
toward setting the ultimate standard of medical care and assuring autonomous decision making 
for those dying. 
 In the United States, it is estimated that spending on end-of-life care is between ten to 
twelve percent of overall spending for healthcare.121 Between 25 to 30 percent of all Medicare 
benefits are expended for end-of-life care.122 There is a significant volume of evidence which 
substantiates the conclusion that, in multiple health care settings such as hospitals and in nursing 
homes, hospices are cost effective.123 
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 The central ethical question in death management remains: namely, the extent to which 
“marginally beneficial” treatment should be offered and then maintained.124 Because of the 
inherently subjective nature of weighing costs versus benefits and considering over-utilization or 
under-utilization of medical care and treatment, a “just right” mean between these options will be 
exceedingly difficult to set or establish.125 
 The doctrine of medical futility is an efficacious framework for principled decision 
making within the medical profession.126 Acceptance of this doctrine as a construct for medical 
decisions allows—in turn—for a greater openness to utilize palliative sedation. When necessary 
to accommodate the best interests of a patient and to alleviate refractory pain and suffering, 
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